Addressing the intersections of economic opportunities and scriptural interpretation, this article examines how Buddhist monks involved in the Mongolian gold rush view the ethics of mining. Commonly regarded an act of theft and violence within Mahāyāna Buddhism, mining is locally subject to strong ethical denunciations. Drawing on historical connections and transnational devotional practices, the mining monks engage creatively with a method of meditation known as 'breaking the mind', which offers a competing way of knowing the world. Focusing on the universe within which they conceptualize action, they present a radical reinterpretation of ethical human life. I argue that the mining monks' own conceptual framework highlights the analytical importance of attending to not only visible bodily action, but also people's self-reflection in our attempts to understand the place of the ethical in human life.
Do you remember how there used to be gers and tents (maihan) everywhere? And people had their mining holes and took the dirt down to the river to pan for gold?
Now almost all the ninjas are gone. They have moved elsewhere. But it isn't because gold is no longer reaching (hüreh) us. We are still finding a lot of gold! It is harder, it truly is, and we do need the machinery. It is big business now. Not like before! Batbold lit a cigarette and inhaled deeply before continuing.
Ninjas always talked about how there was no gold, do you remember? But they were talking nonsense (demii yum yarih)! Pure nonsense. There is plenty of gold. Now that we all have lamas working for us, we just stand there with our water jets and you can see the gold in the dirt. Now that every company has a lam uurhaich, it is no problem finding gold.
The Mongolian gold rush hit the remote mountainous region of Uyanga around the year 2000. As it unfolded, Buddhist monks, known locally as lamas (lam), became centrally involved in carrying out rituals for ninjas and other gold rush participants. Lamas were often consulted to specify auspicious moments for the initial 'breaking of the soil' (gazar höndöh).
When a new mining-hole reached the gold deposit and the ninjas began 'branching out' (burzaih), lamas were often invited to the site to 'give offerings' (örgöl örgöh) to spirit beings that were said to hold, if not withhold, the precious metal. If an accident happened, the injured ninja was quickly taken to the monastery or the private homes of lamas for the 'readings of texts ' (unshlaga unshih) . And at times of illness and affliction, lamas were usually consulted for advice and treatment. As I have discussed elsewhere (Author 2013a), the advent of the gold rush became pivotal to the daily life and liturgy of Uyanga's religious specialists.
But although the village lamas have now been involved in the gold rush for more than a decade, the precise nature of this involvement has changed drastically over the years. As Batbold commented, the emergence of 'lam uurhaich', which can be translated as a 'mining monk' or a 'mining lama', has been particularly consequential. Swopping their maroon and amber robes and felt boots for old jeans and Chinese rubber boots, some of the village lamas have now joined the mining companies in the warmer summer months as contract miners.
Some of them drive the heavy machinery, while others work the high-pressure water jets. At the end of the mining season, they return to the monastery to work fulltime as lamas. The first time I heard about lam uurhaich was during a stay with one of my host families living on the steppe. It was an early morning when my host father initiated a conversation that I was well familiar with; a conversation in which he lamented the current state of affairs. The rain had not been forthcoming, the grass was not as green and tall as usual, the animals were not fattening up. I half-listened to the almost customary lament until he added: "And, now our lamas are 'washing dirt' (shoroo ugaah)! We, our Uyanga, now have lam uurhaich!" I must admit I initially scoffed at this and joined in my host father's lament. However, when I later began fieldwork with the mining lamas, I realized that I had to not only question my own readiness to deride the lamas' direct involvement in mining but also take seriously the ways in which the lamas conceptualized and reflected on their own actions. They emerged as far from apt instantiations of a Simmelian financialized universe where money come to envelop and express our fundamental sense of being (Simmel 1903:104) . Earning money from mining has not led to the surrender of the lamas' sense of being to the mediating schema of exchange and the quantifiable value of money. Their 'personal substances' and collective 'way of life'
have not been extensively homogenized through the prevalent circulation of the moneymediator so as to abolish their devotional practices and bonds with others. For the mining lamas themselves, monetary value and religious virtue are not mutually conflicting and this recognition has made them an important, if not unique, asset to the mining companies.
For Batbold and many of the other mining company supervisors, the direct involvement of lamas in the mining for gold has transformed the potential of gold mining in the region. In their eyes, it is an event that despite years of intense mining has now made gold even more accessible and more plentiful. As a result, most mining companies are keen to include 'mining lamas' in their work force and most companies today have at least one lam uurhaich working for them. Among the village lamas, however, it is an event that articulates and in turn produces growing frictions within an already divided monastic community. It is an involvement that highlights generational divides, pitching junior lamas against their seniors, bringing to the fore their differing understandings of how one ought to live and act.
Reflections on and questions about ethical conduct have now become pressing, particularly among the lamas themselves. Based on extensive ethnographic fieldwork carried out between 1 They draw attention to how Durkheim effectively aligned ethics with concerns about social norms, regularity, and control. Durkheim engaged Kant's conception of 'the moral law' and was interested in why rules received sanction and why following them appeared so attractive to people. But whereas for Kant (2005 Kant ( [1785 ), 'the moral law' was a universal and a priori basis for acting in accordance with the demands of practical reason, thereby bringing attention to the role of reasoning, doubt and free will, Durkheim (2009 Durkheim ( [1906 :35-62) saw 'moral facts' as socially constituted and revealing the particular structures of a society. As a codified representation of society, ethics thus became allied with understandings that mandate and motivate collective cohesion (Laidlaw 2002 (Laidlaw :312, 2014 .
In an attempt to disentangle ethics from this nexus of social structure, power and ideology, Michael Lambek has in his recent work approached ethics as a constitutive part of the human condition that is grounded in "the complexity and perhaps inconsistency of human action and intention" (2010b:9). Approaching ethics as a communicative event, a dialectical movement between speech and action, Lambek seeks to move beyond Durkheimian ascriptions of fixity and certainty to reposition ethics within the plurality and nonconformity of human action. (Keane 2010:82) , how are we to make sense of the ethical independently of that which is spoken?
Rather than privileging familiar grammars, I suggest we take our starting point in acknowledging the diverse ways in which people comprehend and construct the world as a conceptual entity; that is to say, the particular epistemological constructions that people generate and favour. In the works by James Faubion (2011) and James Laidlaw (2014) , palaces and farm houses, weather conditions and statistical calculations become actors that impinge on and influence human self-constitution and expression. This contingence affects legal and quotidian understandings of human agency, responsibility, and accountability. In an apt example offered by Laidlaw (2010:151) , a sudden wind catches the curtains in a window, making them knock over a vase that falls on a passer-by's head. Here, a distributed chain of cause and effect reminds us that agency, responsibility, and accountability need not reside within a single individual, or indeed even a human being. In this article, I suggest that we need to ask not only to which entity we ascribe responsibility. We need to also ask the bigger question of what kind of conceptual totality people see themselves and their various others to be acting in. Rather than promoting a totalizing theoretical holism (Bubandt and Otto 2010:6) , it is a call to recognize people's own reflections on the holistic epistemological undertaken and practised will lead to welfare and happiness', then you should engage in them (Thera and Bodhi 2011:66) .
In the rest of the sutra, Buddha leads the Kālāmas to the realization that greed, hatred, and delusion lead to harm and suffering for oneself and others. Concluding that they should therefore abandon such actions, the villagers rejoice in the restitution of their moral clarity. In this teaching, Buddha shows how a life of reflection and moral restraint brings its own intrinsic rewards of happiness and wellbeing -whether or not people recognize the karmic laws of existence, another life after death, or the possibility of final liberation. Simply by taking up human bodily form, the Kālāmas are seen to possess the intellectual capacity to recognize and valorize the fundamental ethical distinctions that are central to Buddhist practice. 8 It is thus by virtue of our consciousness rather than our faith that we can see the truth of the teachings.
In a country where the Buddhist establishment was aggressively repressed through decades of Soviet socialist anti-religious campaigns and reinstated in only 1991 (Kaplonski 2008 (Kaplonski , 2012 , it is not surprising that the lama chose to recite this particular sutra. This is a region where people were not able to devote themselves openly and freely to Buddhist practice for several decades. It is also a region where lamas and laity continue to look towards Inner Mongolia, Tibet and India in particular for what they deem to be 'authentic' (jinhene) and 'true' (zöv ünen) practice. It was not long ago that one of the older village lamas worked as a math teacher at the local school and later as an accountant for a small company. And that one of the other older lamas struggled to hold down a steady job at the negdel (herding collective) due to his penchant for vodka. Today's older generation of lamas all have extensive personal histories that connect them to mundane jobs and ordinary lives independently of their extant Buddhist devotion. With an ethics that is grounded in the capacity for reflection rather than years of devotion, these older lamas are today generally much respected by the laity.
Although they have only been able to practice openly in their adult years, their personal struggles, efforts and courage seem central to their present positions as 'moral exemplars' (Humphrey 1997 :34, Atwood 2004 . Some members of the laity remember how several lamas practiced in 'secret' despite facing the risk of imprisonment, if not death by shooting.
Others assisted them in hiding old Tibetan books, silk wall hangings, and brass paraphernalia from the authorities. When the monastery of Uyanga was rebuilt in 1991, it was a major effort that was led by this older generation of lamas. They reinvigorated ritual traditions, reinstated ceremonial calendars, and re-launched the recruitment of novices. Addressed by the laity with the honorary title of bagsh ('teacher'), they are now generally regarded as central to the "professional rationalization of ethics" (Lambek 2010b:3) . Given this position, 
The flourishing of ignorance
It all started around 1993 when the Mongolian mining company Erel began mining for gold a few kilometers from the village. This event marked the transformation of Uyanga into 'a place where people only live for themselves', as an elderly herder put it -into 'a place where nature (baigal) suffers'. Erel diverted and set up dams on the local river, which shortened its course and made the water undrinkable for people and animals living downstream. Erel used the river water for its water jets, which it directed at the gold-bearing valley floors. The resulting slurry was led through sluice boxes and tall heaps of waste tailings were left behind.
Industrial diggers slowly worked their way up the valleys, followed by ninjas who arrived in their thousands and started panning the waste tailings for leftover gold. Eventually the goldcontent of the tailings was so minimal that many ninjas began the hard work of prospecting and digging new mining holes using only hand-made metal picks. They hauled the sacks of gravel to the surface and transported them to the nearby river for panning. 2003:618) . Given this particular use, gold is today often described as 'a very special and precious treasure that is connected to the gods'.
This connection, however, is more than one of symbolic representation. As I have discussed elsewhere (Author 2013a), gold is also seen to be 'held' (barih), if not 'withheld' (tatgalzah), by powerful spirit beings known as lus that dwell in and around water sources. As in the regional literature on Tibetan protective deities known as 'treasure guards ' (de NebeskyWojkowitz 1956:253) , lus are said to have adorned their dwelling places with gold.
Staircases, walls, and floors are all made of gold, as is their armor if they have any.
Sometimes they protect themselves with gold shields or brandish swords made of gold. At other times they drink from gold cups or curl themselves around enormous gold nuggets. In order for humans to obtain gold without 'stealing' from lus, it is therefore necessary to first try to persuade them to part with their treasure. If humans fail to do this, lus are likely to get angry and might inflict calamities such as illnesses and accidents. Desiring a metal that is so closely guarded and so destructive to extract, gold mining is considered a hulgain hereg, meaning 'an act of theft', potentially giving rise to a dogshin baidal, which can be translated as a 'state of violence'. Gold mining is considered a dangerous activity that entails a fundamental disregard of other beings.
Yet, lamas recognize that this human disregard for others is not necessarily intentional.
Although human beings within Buddhist cosmology enjoy an exceptional rebirth where intentionality is one of our distinguishing features, it does not necessarily direct all of our actions. Indeed, sometimes Uyanga's miners are seen to be incapable of controlling what they do. In the region, the gold rush is described as a kind of centripetal force that pulls (tatah) people in. "We can't move away from the mines", a ninja once commented when she and her husband failed to move back to the steppe. "Every time we try, we are pulled back" (tatagdah). She made a fist and pulled it strongly in a direct line towards her body. Batbold, mentioned in the opening vignette, similarly felt that there was "a strong thing" (hüchtei yum)
in Uyanga. Placed in opposition to this force, miners are often described as 'having little strength' (chadal bagatai). This severance of action from intention is said to be a manifestation of the so-called altny chadvar, meaning 'the power of gold'. Now flourishing in Uyanga, this is an invisible substance that is said to emerge when people extract the heavy and dangerous gold. Given its invisibility, the materiality of altny chadvar is little known but some people describe it as a sort of 'invisible dust' (haragdahgüi shoroo) that rubs off gold during the process of extraction. When people come into contact with this, an 'illness'
(övchin) spreads among its victims; an illness that has one dominant symptom: Namely, an obsessive longing or greed for the precious metal.
Important for this discussion, Marilyn Strathern (1997:142) has observed that actions that are carried out unconsciously, for example under the influence of sorcery, are often not subject to the same moral evaluation as conscious actions. In this sense, unconscious actions may be regarded as amoral rather than immoral. This is also the case in Uyanga where the potential presence of altny chadvar unsettles any quick and easy denunciation of miners' actions.
Rather than mining being a clear act of human volition, altny chadvar is deemed partly responsible for the continuation of the mining boom. However, it does not relieve miners of the moral judgment as to why they decided to join the gold rush in the first place. Indeed, it only intensifies the question. Why did they decide to go to the mines in search of this precious treasure connected to both gods and lus when altny chadvar makes it so hard to leave the mines again? Why are people willing to risk the loss of their own strength by joining the gold rush?
Many miners deflect such questions by emphasizing that the potential interaction with and influence of nonhuman forces in human life is part of the conditions of human existence.
Whether or not you are a miner, your 'strength' (chadal) is always subject to the ebbs and flows of fortune and other forces (Humphrey and Ujeed 2012) . Rather than being discrete and separable, fixed and defensible, it is subject to much speculation and sense-making. As such, the illness-inflicting invisible dust of altny chadvar is seen to exemplify more generally the dangers and demands that are placed on people when they try to make a living.
For many village lamas, however, miners are not really trying to make a living. 
Lam uurhaich
One of the village lamas involved in the gold mining is Mönherdene -Budlam's oldest son.
Mönherdene joined Uyanga monastery in the mid1990s and had always wanted to become a lama. As a child, he used to steal glances of his father's strange-looking texts and eagerly awaited the moment when he was allowed to ring the bell during recitations to summon the gods. Initially he spent the mornings at the village school and the afternoons studying the texts together with the other novices at the monastery. When he finally graduated from school, he made the transition to fulltime lama by joining his father and other lamas in the daily recitation of texts at the monastic 'meetings' (hural). A few years ago he married his long-term girlfriend and they moved to their own ger in his father's compound half a mile from the monastery. Soon thereafter they had their first child -a scenario that is common among Mongolian lamas. Drawing on his personal contacts, Mönherdene then asked a mining company supervisor for work. Having some experience driving regular cars, he was offered a job the following spring as a dump truck driver, hauling dirt from the open-pit gold mine. He explained to me how he wanted this job in order to make some much-needed money for his family. As a junior lama, he received a monthly salary of only 60'000MNT (approx. 50USD), roughly half of his father's base salary from the monastery. Moreover, junior lamas were rarely invited to carry out personal readings or participate in ritual events outside the monastery, which provided more senior lamas with a substantial additional income. Before I first met Mönherdene, Budlam described his son's arrangement to me. He had just returned from the mines where he had done extensive readings together with two other village lamas at the request of a troubled mining company owner in significant debt. In a tired and exhausted voice, Budlam explained:
Our son does readings at the monastery. But he can't be a lama with a wife and child on such a low income. It's hard. So he goes to the mines in the summer and doesn't attend our meetings. If he doesn't have any other jobs this winter, he might try to come back to the monastery and read with me again. But he might also find that he can't be a lama anymore.
The mining company pays Mönherdene a monthly salary of 300'000MNT (approx. 250USD) and has mentioned potential pay increases as his skills and experience improve. Since there are few other jobs available in the region and hardly any that will offer that kind of salary, Mönherdene considers himself lucky to have landed a job in the mines -even if it has given rise to many clashes with his parents and senior lamas at the monastery. One day Mönherdene took me on a trip through the mines and showed me his truck. He had decorated the inside of the cab with blue silk scarves (hadag) and hung talismans of guardian spirits (sahius sahigch) from the rearview mirrors. He had also glued a small plate of incense (utlaga) to the truck's dashboard and taped a handwritten mantra above the front driver's door. This, he explained, was to ensure that his mind stayed on the 'right' (zöv) path and to ward off the unwanted forces that he deemed omnipresent in the area. As he said, If you are not careful when you mine, bad things will happen. Many people are not careful so I have to protect myself.
It is not unusual in
A particular concern for Mönherdene was the presence of altny chadvar. Given the importance of consciousness for his Buddhist practice as a lama, the affliction of altny chadvar would be detrimental to his future in the monastery. Once, in a serious tone, he admitted that if ever afflicted, his father would be right -then he would not be able to return to the monastery. Like Mönherdene, other lam uurhaich also actively seek to protect themselves and have similarly furnished their front loaders, diggers, and trucks. Working in an area where acts of violence and theft against other beings are said to flourish, evidence of the dangers involved in mining is plentiful. Only a few weeks earlier a man operating a digger died under a landslide. The miners saw this as evidence of lus punishing humans for their wrongdoings. According to Mönherdene, several of his lay co-workers do not display appropriate respect for lus. Instead of engaging lus through caring and good thoughts, through beckoning and propitiating them to part with their treasure, Mönherdene described how the miners triumphantly mine the ground and celebrate the gold coups. They dare each other to excavate further into the caving hillsides and dig deeper craters. In his view, these careless challenges are meant to test not only the miners' courage and the limits of the dangerous mining landscape but also the angered lus. "Lus nüdgüi", he said -meaning, 'lus have no eyes'. With lus attacking randomly or blindly, it does not necessarily take its anger out on the perpetrator. Instead it may attack anyone who has crossed the perpetrator's path. In a busy working environment where people work closely together, it means that dangers are imminent, also for the mining lamas.
Although the senior lamas are also involved in the gold rush, they make a key distinction between their own involvement and that of their juniors: The younger generation at the monastery has sought a source of income that is predicated not on appeasing but angering lus.
Instead of respecting other beings, it entails causing them harm. This is an ethical distinction that for the senior lamas renders the generated income sinful and emblematic of a straying mind, that is, a mind that harbors wrong and harmful thoughts. As such, the bodily actions of mining are entangled with the physical object of money as well as the contemplative faculty of mind. While the mining company supervisors applaud the junior lamas for helping them to make gold more accessible, the senior lamas condemn the juniors' willingness, if not eagerness, to work for the mining companies. Rather than respecting the multiple beings with whom humans co-exist, they are seen to act as if they were 'free' (chölöötei) and the universe was 'empty' (hooson), as if their actions entailed no interaction. But how is it possible to embrace such a detached and autonomous view of being only to actively seek a return to the monastery six months later to join the senior lamas in the daily readings?
Creative orthodoxy
There is a cluster of Mahāyāna writings that endorse a radical reinterpretation of Buddhist and some of its commentaries largely on his own. Eventually, when Amartüvshin returned the following year, he was said to have added other Yogācāra texts and a concerted group of devotees began to form. However, with Amartüvshin only making brief and occasional visits, the devotees received limited guidance in their fervent study and application of insights. This absence of a teacher opened up a novel devotional space in which the novices engaged and applied their committed practice.
Gansüh began gold mining around year 2010. His son was approaching 2 years of age and his wife was pregnant with their second child. Like Mönherdene, Gansüh needed to earn more money for his family than he was receiving from the monastery. For Gansüh, gold mining became an occasion for training his mind. "I'm just a low sutra lama", he explained. "I can't work with my mind all the time". So when he left his compound in the early morning and drove across the river to the mining valleys, he began various meditation exercises. He told me how he reflected on how it is that we know things and why we cling on to our 'interpretations' (tailbar) so much so that we 'mistake' (anduurah) our own projections of the world for the world itself. He did not question whether or not gold really existed. Rather, he questioned the desire, grasping, clinging and longing for gold and the way in which such experiences affected his perceptions of actions surrounding gold. For him, gold mining seemed to habitually bring into being a world of interpretation in which there were 'two things' (hoyor yum) on opposite sides: him and gold, miners and the land, company bosses and money. "Always two things" (dandaa hoyor yum), he said emphatically. When mining for gold, it was tempting to interpret 'humans' (hümüüs) as pitched against gold and its associated entanglements (alt malt). Echoing the words of a Yogācāra scholar, it is a scenario in which "individual beings are caught in the dual appearances of an observer and an observed, a 'knower' and what is 'known'" (Devenish 2012:13) . Gansüh thus tried to question his own desire, grasping, clinging and longing, and reflected on the obstacles that prevented him from seeing the 'true conditions of human life'. Or, as he put it, 'the complete truth' (tögs ünen): A truth that did not involve such dual confrontations.
Significant for this article, a key contributor to these false interpretations is language:
Yogacārins contend that "language never directly refers to anything but itself" (Lusthaus 2013:29) . It is a system of self-referentiality and self-closure where "the act of reference operates by foisting the illusion that what is being referred to 'exists' outside the realm of language" (ibid:58). That is to say, when we make use of language, we effectively alter and distort our perceptual stream, engaging in a phenomenological reduction that creates, often imperceptibly, 'objects' as if they existed outside of consciousness, as if there was a world of permanence. Grammars are considered central to this illusion. When sharing a grammar with others, we participate in a system that extends beyond ourselves. Grammars are not subject to the spatio-temporal limitations of any individual nor our emotional or experiential states. For those unaware, our adoration of language can consequently give rise to the illusion of all things, including our-selves, as having a permanence and unconditionality that we find comforting and reassuring, desirable and pleasurable. Rather than generating and instantiating ethical criteria as Lambek (2010a) suggested, language in the abstract (grammar and semantics) as well as in its ordinary use (pragmatics) is here considered a potential obstacle to critical awareness and ethical judgment. But this does not mean that Yogacārins are promoting silence or an alternative language. Instead Yogacārins contend that it is crucial to critically reflect on and be constantly aware of how we use language. Otherwise our language use will merely reinforce self-centered desires and attachments, inhibiting us from ever overturning our erroneous interpretations of the world. By engaging in meditation, coming to understand the world as having no enduring or finite elements set in opposition to each other, it is said that we will be able to experience, through our awareness, things as they really are ethical work to reside in the conceptual totality that they create for themselves. If they unknowingly endorse the dualist tendency of human perception, they will not be able to judge the ethics of human conduct and instead continue to feed a self-centric view of human existence.
While the Yogācāra doctrine concerns a broad range of fundamental epistemological questions, Uyanga's lam uurhaich engage mostly issues surrounding developing this socalled 'right view'. I suggest that this is partly a reaction to the devotional practices of the older lamas at the monastery. For Mönherdene, the older lamas including his own father place too much emphasis on actions of the body and the tongue. As a result, they not only privilege the human body and language as the main vehicles through which we carry out actions, but also ignore the relationship between bodily action, language and perception. This, he lamented, lead to a marginalization of that which is significant about the human state of being: namely, our consciousness. Rather than engaging in acts of violence and theft, he considers his mining actions to also involve powerful meditation, which creates spaces of continuity rather than confrontation -spaces where the miner and the land cannot be presumed to be opposed or even separate. As Mönherdene explained,
In the old days, when people meditated a lot and their mind became pure, they could walk to India on foot in only three days. Or get to the top of mountains, like the one over there, in just three steps. They could walk faster than wild horses. They could walk faster than cars.
They would simply close their eyes and call forth the places they wanted to reach. They would get there simply by seeing them with their eyes, by thinking about them. That's because nature is empty.
There is nothing. So with their mind, they could pull it, roll it, and set foot on it. Now there's no one like that in Mongolia! They have all been killed. But there will be some again in the future. Someone like Amartüvshin might reach a state like that.
In this kind of universe, it is not actions of the body and the tongue that are first and foremost subject to moral scrutiny, but the state of the mind. What counts, even for novice practitioners like Mönherdene, Gansüh and the others, is the extent to which they try to dissolve conceptual dualities. When they get accused of disregarding other beings during mining, it is for them an accusation which reduces all action to only that of the body. It is an accusation, which privileges the visible and material body as the primary, if not only, locus of agency and overlooks the importance of human consciousness. Since it is by virtue of our consciousness that we can reflect on how we live our lives in the present, on how we reside together with other beings, their creative application of Yogācāra doctrine can be seen to offer the mining lamas a greater range of permissive actions than currently available to the other lamas. They have created a new and unexpected space within which they justify seemingly unwholesome bodily actions by claiming to hold non-objectifying thoughts.
Conclusion
In the remote mountains of Mongolia, a group of village lamas have turned to new devotional practices that differ markedly from the orientation of their monastery. Drawing on historical connections and personal relations that extend far beyond national borders, the lam uurhaich engage passionately and innovatively with classic scriptures that offer a competing way of knowing the world. In the absence of local teachers who can offer guidance and instructions, the young devotees explore novel convergences between the doctrine and their work in the mines. Since the soteriological path of Yogācāra requires a deep and critical venture into the realm of consciousness, its followers present a radical reinterpretation of human action and its ethics. Rather than seeing gold mining as an act of violent confrontation with and greedy theft from other beings, the mining lamas claim that their method of meditation has made a different world knowable. As they excavate and haul the gold-rich dirt, their bodily actions may appear similar to those of any other miner. But for them, the totality within which they conceptualize their own actions is significantly different. As they see the land folding under their machinery and they encourage lus to share the riches, the devotees remind us that their way of understanding the world is not simply a trivial matter of description or secondary elaboration. Instead, it constitutes the very condition for self-understanding and other-relating.
It is, for them, the realm within which ethical judgment becomes an actual possibility.
This turn to new devotional practices is centrally linked to the material and economic aspirations afforded by the Mongolian gold rush. In a region of limited income opportunities, gold mining has suddenly brought unprecedented amounts of wealth within reach of its various residents. Bringing celebrity 'high sutra lamas' like Amartüvshin to this distant village, welcoming them with large prayer ceremonies and lavish celebrations, the booming gold wealth has also enabled younger lamas to continue their poorly paid monastic practice.
By recognizing this economic reality, we should, however, not underestimate the existential dimensions of devotional practice. As Mönherdene, Gansüh and the others have demonstrated, 'breaking the mind' is as much about their generation of karma, their place in the universe, their dualist mind, as about anything else. Meticulously engaging multiple projects, they demonstrate how local religious practice exceeds its basic instrumentality.
When we take seriously their engagement with Buddhist metaphysics and attend to their own ruminations, we can see how the teachings become imbricated with the devotees' own material, ethical, and philosophical undertakings. And we can also see how questions of ethics hinge on culturally meaningful ways of conceptualizing actions that take place in a universe that we cannot presume to already know.
Rather than arguing that the epistemological underpinnings of human life are so at odds as to be "incommensurable" (Povinelli 2001) With a theoretical proclivity for social structure and relational analysis, anthropological studies of ethics have remained firmly within a "sociological imagination" (Mills 2000 , cf.
Yan 2011) that sees social interaction as the presumed and exclusive locus of ethical judgment and experience. But why draw on theoretical frameworks that value the social to such an extent that it is accorded a universality and primacy that leaves little analytical space for individual self-reflection?
I wonder if this proclivity is a response to an unease with the long-standing and influential tradition of moral philosophy and a view that "philosophers..do not concern themselves with locating the moral subject within social and cultural worlds" (Howell 1997:7) . Is it because we assume that in order for us to make sense of those forms of action that do not disclose themselves primarily through social relations and human speech, we must draw on atomistic theories of moral action? Is it because an attempt to understand people's self-reflection is feared to edge closer to a moral philosophy interested in pure and abstracted reason? Or is it maybe because anthropologists have taken to heart insights from psychology and cognitive sciences that people's "self-knowledge is limited and untrustworthy" (Keane 2010:66) ? That
Descartes's trust in our faculty for reasoning and self-skepticism is proven limited, thus rendering human self-understanding, lest disclosed through speech acts and other forms of social interaction, an irrelevant element for analysis? As a celebration of the relational basis of social theory (cf. Yarrow et al. 2015) , this 'sociological imagination' privileges socially mediated action as the more reliable, if not objectifiable, realm within which human ethical self-formation occurs.
But this accent on the social, where humans become "surfaces to one another" and externalize themselves "in an objective form" (Keane 2010:69, 81) , risks reproducing the deep and perhaps deepening separation of thought from action that Arendt (1958) saw as the besetting problem of the modern age. Attaching value to truth and objectivity, 'contemplation' becomes deceptive whereas 'making' becomes the grounds for experiments and observation. We should be wary of participating in these modernity projects when seeking to understand human encounters, unless we are willing to admit that we either see a concept of truth to underlie our disciplinary endeavors or agree to the demise of human contemplation. This is an ethical question crucial not only for Mongolia's mining lamas but for us all. 
Notes
Acknowledgements. This article originally grew out of a paper that I presented at a conference entitled 1 Alongside Durkheim, these works also identify other scholarly legacies as burdens. Lambek discusses how Boas's "often-compelling identification of particular cultural values produced overly homogenous and bounded portraits, objectifying both individual values and the cultures they composed" (2010b:13, see also Fassin 2008:337) while Laidlaw highlights how, in Kantian ethics, "it is impossible… to see how specifically ethical considerations might be distinguishable " (2002:315) . 2 Although Lambek does give attention to issues of judgment, his interest in the relation of speakers to their words makes him approach judgment exclusively as part of social interaction and performance. Arendt, in contrast, develops roughly two conceptual models: Judging as a faculty of politically engaged actors who judge in order to act, and judging as a contemplative self-reflexive faculty of non-participating spectators who judge in order to cull meaning from the past. For Arendt (1978a Arendt ( , 1982 , judgment is thus coeval with understanding, imagination and reconciliation -actions that do not necessarily rely on the spoken word. 3 This is not to say that I do not recognise the importance of interaction and the spoken word when interlocutors later tell the anthropologist about their thoughts. However, although the enterprise of anthropology is premised on such dialogues to accompany observations and participations, this subsequent dialogue between interlocutor and anthropologist should not render insignificant people's initial contemplative actions. 4 The Sanskrit word 'Dharma' is derived from the root 'dhŗ' which means 'to carry', 'to uphold' or 'to support'. In Buddhist terminology, it has various meanings ranging from the state of Nature "as it is" (Pa. yathā bhutā) to the teachings of the Buddha. 5 A version of this story is recounted by Buddha in Bālapaṇḍita Sutta "Fools and Wise Men" in Majjhima Nikāya (Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 2001 (Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi :1016 (Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi -1028 . Buddha tells this story in order to convey to his followers how long it will take to regain a human bodily state from the realms of hell. 6 In Uyanga the most commonly used word with a meaning equivalent to the English term 'volition' is zorilgoor. This expression is in the instrumental case and can be translated as 'with an aim', 'with a goal', 'with a purpose', thus used in expressions like zorilgoor hiisen üil ('an act done with a purpose'). Another word that is commonly used among the laity is sanaatai. This expression is in the comitative case and can be translated as 'with mind', 'with thoughts'.
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